Introduction
This is a study of the Turkish parliament in the crucial decade of 1992-2002 which sheds light on important issues, dilemmas, and obstacles facing Turkey in its path to the European Union (EU).
1 During this decade, Turkish parliamentarians raised and answered questions on the importance of the EU, its policies towards Turkey and other countries as well as whether Turkey should join the European Union and under what circumstances. In its attempt to map and evaluate EU debates in the Turkish parliament, the chapter is divided into four sections. The first provides a justification for studying national parliaments and the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) in particular. The second explains why Turkish parliamentarians remained committed to Turkey's EU accession despite their serious concerns and grievances over European policies. Starting from the early 1990s and the wars in Bosnia and the Caucasus, we examine a number of issues Turkish parliamentarians debated publicly, including crises with the PKK, Greece and the country's EU candidacy status. Section three provides a case study from August 2002, when Turkish parliamentarians, acting in accordance with EU prescriptions, legislated in favor of minority broadcasting in the country. Finally, section four concludes the study by providing relevant policy prescriptions and future research directions.
The Turkish Grant National Assembly
Although not the only place to study discourse and policymaking, a country's parliament, in this case the Turkish Grant National Assembly, has several advantages over other sources, such as local newspapers, evening news reports, or interviews with experts. Firstly, national parliaments and their archives provide accessible links between discourse and policymaking with both constituting a representative sample of elite thinking and acting. Secondly, unlike interviews which might take place years after a given event, parliamentary debates particularly those occurring at times of crisis, do not allow participants to reconstruct their positions. Parliamentary speeches are unrefined and unedited --unlike an editor's selection of news, whether for a local newspaper or a translated sources, such as FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service). Moreover, parliaments are good reflections of what is said publicly in a country, even though, admittedly, they do not perfectly mirror a society. Even so, national parliaments normally include a variety of voices from all sides of the domestic political scene. And for the decade in question, 1992-2002, at one time or another, all major political parties in Turkey had enough parliamentary representatives to establish a parliamentary group. Arguably, elected representatives reflect their party's views regarding any debated issue, in this case EU accession. It could also be argued, then that these views reflect popular opinion, while at the same time reiterating the dominant thinking of the country's elected elites. Next, in most countries, including Turkey, members of parliament (MPs) enjoy legal immunity. Therefore, they are relatively unrestricted in what they say publicly, thereby making parliamentary records a valuable source of information. Finally, as the records of the parliamentary debates are easily accessible at the website of the TBMM (since 1995) and most libraries in Turkey, findings can be confirmed and re-tested (unlike the information gleaned from interviews).
Europe and the Balkan/Caucasus Wars
In the early 1990s, the wars in Bosnia and Nagorno-Karabakh were among the most important issues debated in the Turkish parliament. The fact that Europe proved itself incapable of stopping these wars marked a negative turn in its image in the Turkish parliament. The sixyear (1987-1993) Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resulted in approximately 10,000 deaths and created about 750,000 Azeri refugees, a tenth of the national population of Azerbaijan, 2 while in Bosnia, more than 150,000 died and 2 million were expelled from their homes --mostly Bosnian Muslims. 3 At the end of the war, Armenians occupied nearly 20 percent of Azerbaijan (four times the area of Nagorno-Karabakh, the original scene of conflict). The Bosnian war lasted from 1992 to 1995 when the Dayton agreement was signed and it included in its latest phase Europe's most extensive post WWII massacre in Srebrenica after the Bosnia Serb Army entered the UN safe haven and assassinated approximately eight thousand men and boys.
In the Turkish press, the military setbacks in Azerbaijan were often compared to the slaughter of Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina. ' We cannot and will not allow another Bosnia on our doorstep', was a common rallying cry in Turkish newspapers, according to the Financial Times. 4 In the Turkish Parliament, Deputy Prime Minister Erdal İnönü argued that 'the silence of the international organizations and the international community to the acts of Serbs in BosniaHerzegovina, has encouraged Armenians in the Caucasus as well.' 5 Another MP, İsmet Gür, made a connection to Turkish nationalism when he framed these conflicts in East/West terms and argued, 'You can stop all the ezans [calls to prayer] in the world if you wish, the West will still see you as a Muslim. The name of all Muslims in the Western world is "Turk" and being a Muslim means being a Turk. That is why in Bosnia-Herzegovina there are genocides and that is why in Chechnya there is another one and that is why in Azerbaijan, northern Iraq, Western Thrace, Cyprus,…there is violence. ' 6 Even so, it was highly unlikely that Turkey would take on a major unilateral expedition in the Balkans or the Caucasus: Bosnia was simply too far from Turkey. Moreover, Russia explicitly warned Turkey not to intervene in Azerbaijan-Armenia. 7 Resentment, however, was inevitable, given the inability of outsiders, Europe in particular, to end these wars. In fact, Turkish parliamentarians used very strong words in their reactions against European policies. For example, conservative DYP MP Baki Tuğ blasted Europe for violating its own principles when it repeatedly stressed human rights issues [for Turkey] while watching the situation in Bosnia/Herzegovina with joy. 8 Another conservative parliamentarian, Esat Bütün, criticized the government for selling out Azeris, their real brothers, in order to be seen as sympathetic to the Western community. 9 Anti-Western and anti-European rhetoric was repeated across the political spectrum, with leftist and former Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit emphasizing the failure of the West to deal with similar conflicts. As Ecevit argued, 'Turkey is doing nothing but asking help from the West. What happened when the West intervened in Yugoslavia? It accelerated degeneration and collapse of Yugoslavia. What happened in Cyprus? The West made the agreement impossible. What happened in Middle East? When the West intervened, it complicated everything.' 10 Such criticisms, while openly voiced in the parliament, did not deter Turkey from its declared European orientation. For one thing, both conflicts were framed as being external or distant to Turkey. For instance, foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin said: 'The issue of Azerbaijan shouldn't be seen as a part of domestic affairs', 11 while even the leading campaigner of the Azerbaijan cause, President Turgut Özal admitted: 'Actually, Azerbaijanis are closer to Iranian Azeris than Anatolian Turks; we speak the same languages but different dialects, and there is one more distinction; our confessions are different, they are Shiite and we are Sunni.' 12 For another thing, Turkish MPs did not concentrate exclusively on the European Union, but also accused the UN, NATO, OECD, and the Islamic League for failing to protect Bosnia. 13 More importantly, while designing its policy towards state disintegration in USSR and the former Yugoslavia, Turkey was concerned with its own future. Making Bosnia the major issue in Turkish foreign policy would only undermine Turkish positions elsewhere. Thus, until early 1992, Turkey stopped short of supporting the independence of Bosnia, fearing that the problem might be replicated in its own Kurdish region.
14 This latter argument played a key role in subsequent decisions about Kosovo in 1998-99.
Eastern Enlargement and the PKK
In the second half of the 1990s, two interrelated grievances dominated Turkish-EU relations: the EU preference for expansion into Eastern Europe rather than Turkey, and Europe's perceived sympathy for the PKK. Whether real or imagined, these grievances intensified after the Luxemburg Summit in December 1997, when Greece and other countries spearheaded a movement favoring the accession of Cyprus and Eastern European countries to the EU while excluding Turkey. 15 Subsequently, Ankara hardened its positions on all issues including Cyprus, and a few months later, in October 1998, issued a military ultimatum over Syria's support of the PKK and protection of its leader, Abdullah Öcalan. 16 Damascus gave in, and Öcalan left Syria for Russia and eventually for Italy, where he was arrested by the Italian authorities. The Italian government claimed that its constitution prohibited Öcalan's extradition, citing the possibility that Öcalan might face the death penalty. 17 Not surprisingly, the handling of the Öcalan crisis produced a strong reaction from Turkish parliamentarians. Traditionally, Turkish parliamentarians attributed terrorism and political violence to factors external to Turkey and often resorted to a conspiracy rhetoric that cut across the parliament's Left-Right divide. Notably, the leader of the leftist party SHP, Erdal İnönü, saw both the UN and Europe as part of this conspiracy. Other MPs called for unity and asked the people to struggle against the external forces who were trying to divide the country. 18 In the case of Italy's handling of the Öcalan affair, reactions centered on the perceived support a 'terroristt had received from a Western government and a NATO ally. Given Turkey's advantageous position in NATO, Turkish politicians had expected to receive some support from their allies and partners. When this was not forthcoming, MPs reacted against the policies of Italy and other European countries. Abdullah Gül for instance decried the fact that 'several countries formerly considered friendly by Turkey, appeared to have supported a terrorist organization.' 19 Concerning the second major issue dividing Turkey and the European Union, preference for enlargement into Eastern Europe, Turkish MPs have been very critical as well. The EU was accused of favoring the Eastern European states over Turkey, even though these states were less developed. 20 Moreover, leftist DSP MP Mümtaz Soysal argued that Europe could not depend on Turkey for soldiers [i.e. in its various NATO military organizational plans] while at the same time rejecting its membership. 21 On the same subject, conservative ANAP MP Kamran Inan argued that it was not fair for Turkey to be a half-member (partner) and wondered whether halfmembers would be shot with half bullets in a war. 22 In another debate, the same MP used the word 'disloyalty' to describe EU policies towards Turkey. 23 After Luxemburg (1997), Turkish discourse on the EU in general, and Greece in particular, worsened. To cite one of the more blatant examples, MP Sedat Aloğlu said, 'Greece is a chronic problem for Turkey. Greece has an irrational obsession with Turkey and sees whatever is positive for Turkey as negative for itself.' 24 Not surprisingly, the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) benefited from the failure of Turkey's policy in Luxemburg as well as the handling of the Öcalan affair to reach its peak political performance ever and enter the parliament in April 1999 with an astonishing 18 percent which made it the second largest party in the parliament. 25 Once in parliament, MHP members, along with other hard line parliamentarians, targeted Greece and the EU over accession issues and the Öcalan incident. 26 Yet soon after the capture of the PKK leader in Kenya and the successful introduction of the 'earthquake diplomacy' by foreign ministers Papandreou and Cem, tension was replaced with rapprochement. For example, leftist DSP MP Ali Tekin addressed the parliament, arguing that in international relations, friendship and enmity should not be strictly measured, and that the earthquake friendship provided the two nations an opportunity to improve their relations. 27 More interestingly, during the second half of the 1990s, the Turkish political system demonstrated a strong tendency for self-criticism. Not all Turkish MPs blamed the EU exclusively for Turkey's failure to become a candidate member. For example, following the Luxemburg Summit, Abdullah Gül recalled how Turkey had started its relations with the EU and criticized the power-elites of the county (including the military) for failing to develop the economy and democratize even though they knew that these were prerequisites for accession. He addressed, for example, the parliament in the following manner: 'And 34 years ago Turkey was told "Friend: a) Go fix your economy, and b) become a democratic, not a military democracy, in a real sense, a real democracy country.' They gave you 34 years of preparation and everything you did went in the opposite direction. You encountered at least three coups.' 28 Moreover, during the same session, DYP parliamentarian Nahit Menteşe emphasized the government's failure by arguing that Europe not only rejected Turkey, but it also rejected Ankara meaning the Turkish government at the time. Specifically, ruling ANAP and PM Mesut Yılmaz received criticism from the opposition over their own handling of the negotiations. Opposition MPs described how the government lacked coordination with the Minister of Foreign Affairs contradicting the Prime Minister. They also pointed out that the Prime Minister misled the public following his meeting with Helmut Kohl two weeks before the Luxemburg Summit. Yılmaz boasted support from Germany which in fact failed to secure and make unrealistic declarations to the press that unless the EU made Turkey a candidate member in six months, he would withdraw Turkey's application. 29 These criticisms laid the groundwork for a subsequent compromise in the Helsinki European Council Summit of December 1999. Turkey's EU candidacy status came with two conditions for Turkey. For one thing, Turkey committed to accepting the jurisdiction of the International Court in The Hague concerning the Aegean disputes by 2004 at the latest. For another, Turkey did not prevent the accession of Cyprus to the EU. It could be argued that Helsinki was crafted around the principle of constructive ambiguity, a form of terminological acrobatism that avoided direct confrontation with the perceived interests and declarations of each side. With respect to the conditions of the Cypriot membership in the EU, Ecevit claimed that Turkey had received candidacy status, even though Europeans knew of Turkey's determination to protect Cyprus and oppose the island's accession. 30 More importantly, he argued, Turkey would be so powerful in the future that it would solve the Aegean problems on its own terms and not through the International Court in The Hague. 31 In this way, partners in the Ecevit leftistnationalist coalition maintained their previous discourse, while at the same time, leaving their domestic cohesion untouched.
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Lifting Restrictions against Broadcasting Minority Languages
The compromise in Helsinki initiated a wave of domestic and foreign policy reforms in Turkey, including the aforementioned landmark decision to amend the law on broadcasting on August 2, 2002. This amendment, which included an additional article and made several changes in already existing articles, lifted the restrictions on broadcasting in local languages and dialects as long as such broadcasts were not against the main principles of the Turkish Republic and the unity of the state. At the same time, the state reserved the right to audit these broadcasts. All programs in local languages and dialects were to respect the secrecy of private life; they could not promote violence or prompt feelings of racist hatred. On the same day, the parliament issued another amendment in the law concerning the teaching of foreign languages; this amendment permitted the teaching and learning of the various dialects and languages traditionally used by Turkish citizens in their daily lives. The right to teach these dialects and languages was granted to private institutions. Again these institutions could not serve purposes contrary to the main principles of the Turkish Republic and the unity of the state, and they were subject to control by state institutions.
The main opposition to these amendments came from the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), which was part of the coalition government at that time, along with conservative ANAP and leftist DSP parliamentarians. MHP's arguments were based on the assumption that the new articles were prepared primarily because the European Union was now dictating Turkish reforms. In other words, the government could not say no to the EU, as this would represent a major misstep on the path to full membership. Interestingly enough, while speaking as the representative of MHP in the parliament, MP Kürşat Eser did not argue against broadcasting in minority languages. Rather, his arguments were related to what he described as unfair policies of the EU, specifically how the EU had always acted in favor of other candidate countries, and against the interests of Turkey. Having listed many occasions on which the EU acted unfairly against Turkey, he ended his speech without directly referring to the ostensible articles of debate, but by implying that he and his party were against the amendment. 33 Apparently, the main concern of MHP was not the law itself, but rather the fact that this law had, as they saw it, been imposed by the European Union.
Other MHP parliamentarians focused their critiques on the law and its consequences for the unity of the Turkish state. For instance, Sait Gönen contrasted Ataturk's Turkey with Tito's Yugoslavia by emphasizing the role of the Turkish language in unifying Turkish identity. He argued that recognizing the different cultural elements of Turkish citizens as rights would ultimately lead to the legal recognition of minorities, and this, in turn, would harm the unity and harmony of Turkey, and eventually those citizens who used different languages. 34 Gönen's point, a commonly-voiced argument in debates on minority rights, was that the recognition of a group as a minority would worsen that group's situation. As he saw it, a minority group would be in a subordinate position to the majority group. He further argued that the definition of minorities in Turkey was determined by the Treaty of Lausanne, which recognized only the non-Muslim population in Turkey as a minority group. Accordingly, under this Treaty, groups such as the Kurds did not constitute a minority group. Yet if Kurds were given the right to use their own languages in the media, as the proposed amendment allowed, they will be recognized as a minority in Turkey and this would run counter to the Treaty. Gönen implied that the EU had tried to impose the recognition of a new minority group, even though all members of the EU had the right to define their own minorities. 35 In contrast to MHP, most other parliamentary groups agreed that the ban on broadcasts in the various local languages and dialects of Turkish citizens should be lifted. Interestingly, some representatives tried to divert attention away from issues of nationalism and terrorism by introducing a new angle: the fact that liberties were necessary for increasing production. Some people reminded the parliament of a famous thinker, İbn-i Haldun, who had argued that there was a strong connection between restrictions in liberties and a diminishing ability to produce. 36 Therefore, lifting the language bans on broadcasts would increase production in Turkey.
Parliamentarians confronted MHP's arguments on several other grounds. To cite one example, Mehmet Bekaroğlu, of the Islamist SP party asked the parliament, 'Do we do things in order to be a member of the EU, which are not beneficial for our nation or not beneficial for our country?' 'No,' he answered his own question. 37 He argued that the right to speak in one's mother tongue was a natural right. Thus, what they were trying to do with the amendment was a humane act, and the new laws would serve the good of the whole country. Even more interestingly, Nesrin Nas of ANAP stated that 'It should be known, that there is not any country, which was divided by liberties, however, history is full of countries that were divided because of suppression.' 38 In other words, giving more rights to Turkish citizens would have a unifying effect, rather than a dividing effect. Nas and later Ahmet Tan (from DSP) also mentioned that none of the other member states of the EU were divided because of their democratization reforms after joining the EU. 39 Even France, where the notion of the unitary state was very strongly expressed, could preserve its national unity, even though it permitted media broadcasts in local languages. Nas also pointed out that there were no laws in Germany, Spain, Italy, or Denmark, which prevented broadcasts in mother tongues. Moreover, other candidate countries, which had until recently been under communist rule, such as Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania, and Latvia, had taken significant steps towards enabling broadcasts in mother tongues.
Another argument was the presence of Kurdish language broadcasts by illegal channels situated outside Turkey. Through satellite, even in the small villages in Anatolia, people could receive broadcasts from several TV channels, including MED-TV (a communication channel affiliated with PKK). 40 Many of these broadcasts contained anti-state propaganda and were not subject to state control. Accordingly, Nesrin Nas argued that it was impossible to control all means of communication because of the current high level of technology, and ignoring them was not the right position to take. 41 In order to open the lines of communication with people who might be exposed to and misinformed by external broadcasts, it was necessary to allow broadcasts in mother tongues, albeit under state control. Işın Çelebi, from ANAP, argued that when there are too many restrictions in a country, conflicts could emerge and that these restrictions could became a tool to facilitate exploitation by divisive powers. On the other hand, he argued, cultural richness constitutes the beginning of unity and the beginning of development, and it lays down the basis for the creation of a common future. 42 Finally, the representative of SP, Mukadder Başegmez stated that Kurdish language should not be identified with PKK or Abdullah Öcalan as Kurdish is the language of many Kurds who feel themselves to be 'more Turkish than a Turk.'
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Conclusion
The voices of Turkish parliamentarians, speaking in the decade 1992-2002, shed ample light on a number of questions about Turkey's contentious path to EU accession. Looking at parliamentary debates, we can dismiss a stereotype of Turkish political discourse as monolithic or lacking self-criticism and compromising voices. The examples cited above highlight areas of increasing diversity in the views of Turkish parliamentarians. Parliamentary speeches constitute a representative sample of elite thinking and acting, and they are, therefore, mapping the political discourse of Turkey. To some degree, they also identify common ground with EU perspectives and could be of interest to policymakers, especially after the commencement of accession negotiations in October 2005. EU negotiators and officials as well as members of the European Parliament and national parliaments, can also find it beneficial to know about the positions, sensitivities, assumptions, beliefs, and debating styles of their Turkish counterparts.
Concerning future research directions, formal quantified measurements of parliamentary discourse can provide an even more accurate picture of how major issues are framed and debated in the Turkish parliament, providing a refined list of Turkey's priorities in the accession negotiations. 44 On this issue, TBMM demonstrates a vivid political culture which encourages critical views able to absorb both positive and negative signals from the EU. Even during the wars in Bosnia and Nagorno-Karabakh parliamentarians tried to draw and to maintain a fine line between national feelings and state interest including the need for a functioning relationship with the EU. As demonstrated in the broadcasting study, opponents of EU accession framed their reactions to minority languages using the traditional nationalist discourse on the Kurds aligning it to suspicions and accusations against the EU. Whether this is an early warning that the EU may have a reverse effect on Turkey's democratization, is still uncertain and very much conditional on MHP's future electoral performance, emphasis on ethnic nationalism and role in government. It is, however, demonstrated that there is a desire among reformist Turkish elites to defend EU standards not merely as conditions for accession but primarily as necessary reforms for the future of a democratic Turkey. Thus, rather than defending an externally imposed program, Turkish parliamentarians have tried to synthesize European standards with the interests of their own country.
Finally, critics might highlight the incompatibility of EU standards with Turkey's domestic conditions. Synthesizing EU standards with Turkey's domestic needs might threaten the quality and positive effects of those reforms. On the other hand, it is important to emphasize that the uncertainty of Turkey's EU accession and the demonstrated idiosyncrasies of the Turkish elite's thinking might well prevent a too-intrusive EU involvement in Turkey's reform processes. Nonetheless, the reforms should not only be judged by their similarity to European standards --where those exist and they are clearly defined --but with their positive effects and opportunities they provide for the millions of ordinary citizens affected, in Turkey and the Eastern Mediterranean.
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